

Rights and Responsibilities in Calls for Help: The Case of the Mountain Glade Fire

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In this article, we examine a corpus of calls occasioned by a single event, the 1990 Mountain Glade Fire in a coastal community on the Pacific Coast, to consider (a) how the distribution of rights and responsibilities are displayed in the talk of callers to the emergency phone line (9–1–1) and call takers (CTs) who receive them and (b) how these are linked to the directionality and action trajectory of such calls. In the case of the Mountain Glade corpus, the organization of emergency calls and the pre-suppositions and distribution of rights and responsibilities that it institutionalizes was incrementally but systematically altered over the course of multiple calls. In describing the problems encountered by callers and CTs in managing these calls, we note that even in departing from the institutionalized activities emergency telecommunications were designed to facilitate, callers and CTs were not free to disregard its constraints. These observations suggest that the ways in which the organized practice through which an institution is routinely produced and embodied in interaction can be a source of institutional resistance to change. In conclusion, we consider how other events with community wide impact—whether actual or merely potential—may have similar consequences for emergency services such as 9–1–1.

In this article, we examine a corpus of 40 calls occasioned by the Mountain Glade Fire in a coastal community on the Pacific Coast of the United States. Fanned by strong offshore winds, the fire raced down a mountainside producing a huge plume of smoke that that was widely visible and occasioned a large number of calls to 9–1–1. By virtue of the swift

progression of the flames over an area inhabited by thousands, it also recruited callers with specific concerns about the implications of the fire for themselves and their property. Throughout these calls, the fire forms a common (albeit differentiated) focus of concern for both callers and call takers (CTs). Although such events as automobile accidents, loud parties, and fires have the potential to generate multiple calls to 9-1-1, most calls deal with discrete, unrelated events and are processed routinely. There is, then, a possible methodological advantage to be gained by examining this corpus: Multiple calls concerning the same incident allow an analysis of how 9-1-1 call organization bears on how callers and CTs pursue their articulated but differing projects occasioned by this event and the interactional issues such projects encounter within the framework of this activity type (cf. Levinson, 1992).

In previous research, the ability to repeatedly examine a large number of routine 9-1-1 calls has allowed researchers to specify and describe the interactional resources that callers and CTs use to manage the range of interactional and institutional contingencies such calls pose. The corpus of calls occasioned by the Mountain Glade Fire, however, amounts to an extended, naturally occurring social experiment because we can examine a temporally ordered series of calls all purportedly *reporting* the same unusual event. In the most general sense, the corpus allows us to consider a contingency that virtually every institution must confront and that constitutes the most direct challenge to institutionalization as such: How are the routine interactional resources that have emerged to manage typical interactions used to manage exceptional circumstances? In permitting us to examine just these issues, however, our analysis also provides new insight into the organization of 9-1-1 calls across a range of circumstances both routine and exceptional.

We draw out the implications of this juxtaposition by tracking how participants manage the interpenetration of (a) the practices through which such calls are organized and (b) the rights and responsibilities entailed in the activity those practices have been recruited to pursue. Specifically, we show that the routine practices through which routine 9-1-1 calls are organized (a) embody an alignment of identities (service seeker and service provider) that allocates a set of rights and responsibilities and (b) entails a default *directionality* insofar as these practices are designed to facilitate the flow of information into the dispatch center from a vantage point external to it. In the case of the exceptional circumstances posed by the Mountain Glade fire, we track how these routine practices are incrementally but

systematically altered over the course of multiple calls and show that these alterations entail (a) a reversal in the flow of information, (b) a complication of the service seeker and service provider relationship, and (c) a concomitant complication rights and responsibilities entailed in that relationship. Across these transformations, however, participants continued to orient to the systematic relevance of the routine practices (and the rights and responsibilities they are coupled with) that we initially identify. As we show, even in exceptional circumstances, callers and call takers are not free to disregard the ordinary or routine structure of the calls and the constraints embodied in it. In this way, the organized practices through which an institution is routinely produced and embodied in interaction can themselves be a source of institutional resistance to change—a matter of considerable significance as citizens increasingly turn to 9–1–1 call centers for help and information in the event of disasters and catastrophes (whether actual or merely potential) with a community-wide impact.

To begin considering these issues, we briefly review how such calls are typically organized and produced.

CALL ORGANIZATION

The organization of the 9–1–1 call-taking operation is designed to facilitate citizens requests for emergency services while permitting CTs to assess these requests and dispatch help when relevant. With a few notable exceptions, these calls are remarkable for their brevity and order, even on occasions of considerable distress for the caller. One main source for this order and brevity is the *monofocal* character of calls to emergency numbers (and many other service ports). These calls are brief because there is a particular type of business to be transacted that makes closing relevant as soon as it is completed. Although ordinary telephone calls can also be initiated as *monofocal* (e.g., “Just calling to see if you picked up the laundry”), the relationship and shared biography of the callers can generate other business, extending the call across a number of topics often quite removed from the initial reason for the call. In 9–1–1 calls, callers are constrained to present service-appropriate matters, that is, the presentation of problems in need of police, fire, or paramedic response. In turn, the major task of the CT is to collect and codify the information necessary for the timely dispatch of the needed service to the scene of a reported incident.

The compact organization of these calls is keyed to (a) the distribution of actions between caller and CT—callers *report* problems (the reason for the call) and *answer* questions, and CTs *receive* the report and *ask* questions—and (b) the specific alignment of identities placing a call to 9–1–1 CTs enact: Placing a call casts callers as service seekers/informants and CTs as service providers. In these respects, the organization of 9–1–1 calls is geared to a specific directionality: They are designed to facilitate the flow of information into the dispatch center from a vantage point external to it, that is, the caller is conveying information to the CT about some event for which an official (police, fire, paramedic) response is possibly relevant. Callers are usually at or nearby the scene of the problem, positioned to observe and report on events or activities that should be—or are taken to be—unknown to the CT (cf. M. Whalen & Zimmerman, 1990). These actions and their directionality are embodied in and reflect a corresponding distribution of rights and responsibilities: Callers have the right to seek help for some problematic event, and CTs have the right to ask event-dependent questions. Further, callers have the responsibility to answer these questions and CTs the responsibility to—if appropriate—dispatch service in a timely fashion. Finally, the conduct of such calls reflects a set of default presuppositions. The most central and overarching presupposition is that calls to 9–1–1 are *virtual* emergencies (Zimmerman, 1992, pp. 432–434). As we show, departure from these basic orientations, presuppositions, or activities will have consequences for virtually every aspect of the call; and any failure to satisfy any of these constraints results in interactional troubles and, in some cases, an early termination of the call (J. Whalen, Zimmerman, & Whalen, 1988; Zimmerman, 1992).

The concrete realization of these organizational features in any call has systematic consequences for (and is embodied in) the range of practices through which it is produced. For example, the presupposition that the call is a virtual emergency sets up a prealignment of caller and CT as service seeker and service provider that is ordinarily ratified in the first two turns of the call. In these two turns, the CT's categorical self-identification (prototypically, "9–1–1 emergency," occasionally accompanied by an offer of service as in this call) and the caller's acknowledgment of it (typically *yeah*) ratify this alignment and position the parties to engage in a specific type of activity: reporting an event as a method for requesting—and providing—help for the problematic event occasioning the call. These features can be observed in Extract 1, the first report of the fire (C = caller, CT = call taker):

Extract (1) [MG1:CT1F1]

- 01 CT: Nine one one emergency- May I help you
02 C: Ah yes there's a fire just starting at thuh corner of
03 (uh) Two Thirty Five and Mountain Gla:de Roa::d, (uh)
04 brush fire.
05 (2.0)
06 CT: Which side sir
07 C: Ah it'd be on thuh downhill side.
08 (1.0)
09 CT: See anybody around th- See anybody around it
. .
. . ((12 lines omitted))
. .
22 CT: An you went up what thuh top tuh call: or are you in:
23 uh car phone
24 C: I'm on a car phone I was jus' passin' by.
25 CT: Uhkay we'll get someone there.
26 C: Thank you=
27 CT: Unhuh=bye=
28 C: Bye.

As is typical for such calls, *greetings* and *how are yous* are absent but not missing by virtue of the fact that they are not relevant to the type of encounter it is, namely, an anonymous, instrumentally oriented encounter. Their absence “reduces” the opening of this type of call (relative to ordinary telephone calls) and promotes the “reason for the call” to the caller’s initial turn, just after the acknowledgment token that completes the identification sequence (M. Whalen & Zimmerman, 1987). This reduction is one of the “institutional fingerprints” (Drew & Heritage, 1992) of the service call.

The organization of 9–1–1 calls domesticates callers’ concerns by providing a place or “slot” to display them in their first turn. CTs expect to be informed of a response-relevant trouble in the caller’s first turn and pursue such an informing in subsequent turns if it is absent—for example, when callers simply request service without stating the problem (Zimmerman, 1992). As a result of the compact opening of these calls then, callers almost immediately confront (i.e., in their first turn, usually within the first few words) the problem of presenting—in a *service appropriate way*—the trouble that led them to dial the emergency number; we refer to this as the *caller’s problem* (after Halkowski, 2006).

In Excerpt 1, the caller manages this exigency using the most compact and apparently basic turn format used to report codeable events (i.e.,

events amenable to classification in terms of conventional categories): *There is an X at Y*, where *X* is an event and *Y* is a location. The caller reports that “there’s a fire just starting at the corner of Two Thirty Five and Mountain Glade Road.” *X at Y* comprise the core elements of the report because they provide the essential information necessary to initiate the process of providing emergency assistance (with or without the explicit use of the term *report*). In this initial call, the caller expands the *X at Y* format to provide a temporal frame for the event (line 02), “a fire just starting,” marking the report as likely to involve new information. By deploying the core elements necessary for action by the CT, the caller promotes the request for a service course of action he first initiated by placing the call and that the CT explicitly invoked (by expanding her opening to include “may I help you”).

In turn, CTs’ assessment of a caller’s report or request and the collection of further information are in the service of dispatching assistance and closing the call. Thus, in this case, the CT responds to this report by producing a series of questions concerning the precise location of the fire and other event-dependent matters that expand the sequence by delaying the responding action made relevant by the report. This expansion, and the sequence, is brought to a close in line 25 with an “Uhkay” that accepts the action implication of the call so far and CT’s promise of assistance, designed as a response to the callers report/request. The caller then produces a “thank you”—a sequence closing *third* (also typical) that further confirms the service seeker and service provider identities initially established at the outset of the call—and an exchange of terminal particles closes the call.

In this brief overview, we have sketched and illustrated the organized practices through which the institution of emergency response is routinely produced and embodied in interaction. Our analysis of Excerpt 1 demonstrates that the various orientations, presuppositions, and activities of emergency calls we described previously are virtually coextensive, providing the warp and weft of its constituent features and enabling callers to engage in a highly specialized type of activity: the reporting of relatively disparate troubles that possibly require police, paramedic, or fire department response while permitting CTs to manage responses to these reports. As this analysis suggests, these and other service calls are produced within a very tightly organized framework that sets them on a trajectory toward closing from their inception, with participants pursuing “no more, but no less talk than necessary” to accomplish the business of the call. This framework (and the trajectory it entails) is the product of several factors: the *monofocal*

character of the call, the prealignment of identities (service seeker and service provider) in the prebeginning achieved by the dialing of a designated emergency number, and the rights and responsibilities allocated by that alignment. As we have noted, these features of emergency calls have systematic consequences for each of the practices through which each call is realized: Their compact openings and the (modified) request–response adjacency pair (with an insert–expansion sequence) that provides a turn-by-turn structure and overall structural organization within which callers can request assistance and CTs can assess it provide assistance (when relevant) and bring the matter to a close.

In the following, we focus on subsequent calls prompted by the fire, their expansion, and improvisations on them as callers and CTs adapt to the varied concerns and contingencies that the fire prompted for them.

THE CALLS

Public events such as the Mountain Glade Fire can pose challenges for this default organization and the recurrent, routine activities it normally generates because a large pool of residents may have access to the events, and some number of this pool will place calls to 9–1–1. Access to multiple calls on a single rapidly developing event with community-wide consequences then affords a window on how the organization of a service port like 9–1–1 can be challenged by concerns that present increasingly novel demands on both callers and CTs.

The projects pursued in these *same event* calls may vary in certain aspects from the default organization we have described so far, but many also preserve—or seek to preserve—a distribution of rights and responsibilities parallel to routine calls. As the temporal and spatial movement of the fire progressed, however, the distribution of rights and responsibilities was systematically transformed in tandem with the reversal of directionality of the calls. Yet across these novel projects, the default organization of 9–1–1 calls continues to be significant for their production. As we show, for both caller and CT, the turn-by-turn management of contingencies posed by the sorts of departures this fire occasioned reflected their efforts at maintaining an alignment—however tangential—with the normative organization of the canonical call. To begin to appreciate this claim, we turn next to variations in calls placed to report the fire.

Indeed, by producing a nonconforming response that confirms the candidate formulation (“right”)—rather than simply answering the CT’s question—the caller conveys that the location was independently known by him as well and thereby establishes that he had been calling about the *same* fire already known to the CT.

It is worth underscoring that through the sequence initiated in line 4, the participants have established a different activity—CT initiated confirmation that 9–1–1 is aware of an actionable event—than the caller first initiated. Despite the context of this new activity, however, aspects of the request import of that initial activity remain relevant. In this new context, exit from the call must be managed through a modified service announcement. That is, the initiation of the call in a report format, incomplete though it is, still makes relevant a promise of service. However, to respond with a straightforward service announcement, as in Extract 1, might generate trouble because it would retrospectively treat the report as if it concerned a new event. CTs turn in line 8, then, is designed to convey that an institutional response has already been mobilized: “we’re on thuh way,” thereby satisfying the constraints set by the caller’s initial course of action—a report—while acknowledging that the call concerned an already-known-about event. The CT further ratifies the urgency conveyed by the caller’s concern (who is, after all, in an area close to the fire) by expanding the service announcement: “We’ll be there in just a minute.”

In this case, then, the CT’s management of the call as involving a report about a possibly known event occasions a systematic transformation of almost every element of it: The CT’s intersection of the callers first turn, the CT’s offering a candidate location query, the caller’s *confirmation* of the location of the event rather than the reporting of it, the consequent preemption of the interrogative series, and the manner in which the service announcement is delivered all reflect participants’ management of this different circumstance. Only the call’s opening and its terminal tokens remain unchanged. These structural transformations notwithstanding, the CT nevertheless has the responsibility to provide assistance if shown to be needed and to announce its provision. The modified service announcement addresses this responsibility, and as we show later, callers orient to the relevance of this announcement if it is relevantly missing. Even though the intended report has turned out to be redundant, an official response to the event in question is nevertheless indicated. This preserves the basic directionality of the call, the alignment of caller and CT identities as service seeker and service provider, and the distribution of rights and respon-

sibilities established at the call's outset, albeit through redesigned and sequentially relocated actions.

Of course callers can anticipate the contingency encountered in Extract 2, building along with their report, the display of an orientation of the possibility that others may have called before them. Despite the apparent advantages of anticipating this possibility, these calls pose a dilemma for callers. This dilemma emerges from the competency requirement that callers anticipate the conduct of third parties—for example, those who can also see the large plume of smoke and may also report the fire—and how the possibility of other reports might bear on the current interaction between current caller and CT. There is, then, a tension between the caller's right (and, perhaps, a citizen's obligation), to report the event and his or her obligation, as a competent member of society, not to tell a recipient something they already know—especially when the recipient is an officially designated recipient of the particular piece of information. The dilemma is this: To ascertain if the trouble to be reported is already known, the trouble must be reported.

An orientation to this dilemma is evident in even the first caller's report (Extract 1) of a fire “just starting,” which by conveying the *newness* of the event also guards against the possibility that others might have already reported it. Of course, as the fire became visible to an ever larger section of the population, this dilemma became more pronounced and its management more explicit.

So how do callers resolve this dilemma, and what contingencies do caller-initiated confirmation calls pose for CTs? If one turns to Extract (3), one can note that the caller's first turn presents a report, “there's uh fire on the San Pedro Pass” and what amounts to a request to have the CT confirm that she already knows about it: You probably already know but I don't know:

Extract (3) [MG4:CT2M3]

- 01 CT: Nine one one emergency,
 02 → C: Yes there's uh: fire on San Pedro Pass uh you
 03 → prob'ly (is) reported but I don't know ()=
 04 CT: =Yeah San Pedro Pass near Mountain Glade?
 05 C: °Yeah ((very short))
 06 CT: Okay we're on our way to that
 07 C: Thank you
 08 CT: Thank you

By producing both the report core and the confirmation request, the caller builds a turn that consists of two distinct actions, each of which makes relevant a different response. As we noted earlier, CTs respond to reports by launching event-dependent queries aimed at elaborating or clarifying features of the event and its location necessary for the dispatch of a response. The confirmation request, however, makes relevant affirming or negating the proposition embedded in it, in this case that the fire has been reported. The CT aligns with the latter of these by affirming the embedded proposition (“Yeah”), thereby treating *it* as the as sequentially implicative action in the caller’s turn. By responding in this fashion, the CT’s response resolves the caller’s dilemma: The virtual report produced on the way to ascertaining if the CT already knows comes to be treated as if it were simply part of the confirmation request.

This different activity poses a distinct challenge for CTs as well, however: They face the task of determining if the current report concerns one of the fires they already knew about (there were actually two fires burning at this time) or possibly a new fire just starting up. CTs routinely resolve this by offering a candidate location for confirmation by the caller. For example, in Extract 4 in lines 5–6 and again in line 8, the CT invites the caller to confirm that the location she knows about is the one the caller proposed reporting:

Extract (4) [MG8:CT2M7]

- 01 CT: Nine=one=one emergency,
 02 C: Yeah I’d like to report uh fi:re um: I don’ know it
 03 it’s b’n reported already It looks like it’s off
 04 Old San Pedro?=
 05 → CT: =Yeah we’re on our way to that up- up at Two Thirty
 06 → Five? (.) Near thuh top?
 07 C: .hh Uh: [()]
 08 CT: [Two Thirty Five] an’ Old San Pedro?
 09 C: It [looks] like San Oh Old San Pedro area I::m
 10 CT: [(Eh- ee)]
 11 C: across thee way from Tre[verten Oaks
 12 → CT: [Okay Yeah we’re
 13 on our way to that=
 14 C: Okay th[ank you]
 15 CT: [Thank you]

Thus, although the caller and CT manage the project initiated by the caller as involving confirmation, they nonetheless preserve the default

directionality of the call established at its outset. This directionality and its implications for how the participants understand the course of action they have been engaged in is underscored in the CT's delivery of a modified service announcement that satisfies the constraints set by the caller's initial course of action—reporting—and the modified auspices under which it was launched. Also, as we argued earlier, the distribution of rights and responsibilities in these calls is also preserved. The CT's (modified) service announcement *honors* the caller's right to request and receive service and also exhibits her discharge of the responsibility to provide it. In turn, the caller's "thank you" acknowledges the service and the discharge of responsibility. These calls do not readily close without this waltz of right and responsibility, although its rhythm has been transformed by the fact of multiple calls on the fire.

Extracts 5 and 6 involve further variations in the ways that callers can package their orientation to prior calls and variations in the contingencies such calls can encounter:

Extract (5) [MG10:CT1F2]

- 01 CT: Nine one one emergency may I help you.
 02 C: Yes. You probly got some calls already about the fire
 03 up in Mountina Glade?
 04 CT: Yes ((short))
 05 → C: Oka:y.
 06 CT: Yeah we're- we're there.
 07 → C: Okay thanks
 08 CT: Unhuh [Bye
 09 C: [Bye bye

Extract (6) [PC35:CT2M14]

- 01 CT: Nine one one emergency.
 02 (.)
 03 → C: Does thuh fire department know that there's uh big fire
 04 → ((noise)) on San Pedro Pass,
 05 → CT: Yes, we're on our way to that thank you

In these two calls, callers delay the actual initiation of a report in favor of seeking to establish its relevance first using a preliminary sequence. By initiating a preexpansion sequence that delays the report, these callers convey an expectation that it will, in all likelihood, be blocked—as in fact it is.

For our purposes, we want to highlight two especially salient features of the types of calls analyzed in Extracts 3 through 6. First, CTs treat confirming that they already know about the fire as an action made relevant by the callers initiation of a *possible* report: For example, in Extract 4, one can note that the CT suspends her moves to close the call (with a modified service announcement, in line 5) to pursue a confirmation of the location. Only after she has confirmed that is the *same* fire does she reinitiate closings by reissuing the modified service announcement. Second, callers may treat the activity initiated in the call's opening as unresolved until a modified service announcement is delivered. For example, in Extract 5, the caller initially treats the call as unresolved (in line 5) after the CT confirms she knows about the fire but then changes this stance by acknowledging the call's completion (in line 7) after the CT confirms that the fire department is on the scene. As these extracts suggest, the series of sequences observed in Extract 2, which satisfy the rights and obligations of both caller and CTs, constitute the basic minimum components for the activity initiated in the callers first turn. Through these features, reporting as a mode of service seeking is sustained as the overarching activity—however constrained by the possibility of prior reports—and through these features, the provision of service remains relevant even though the virtual report is never actualized. This turns out to be consequential because other calls pursue different agendas that do not make the promise of service relevant.

EMBEDDED INFORMATION AND ADVICE SEEKING

So what other projects did callers pursue? How do these recognizably depart from the default organization of 9–1–1 calls, and how do they transform the rights and responsibilities embodied in the normative organization of such calls? Even after the fire had spread over a sizable area and emergency services were on the scene, callers continued phoning 9–1–1 with a range of projects: Callers sought information; some of those seeking information also sought advice; and in a few cases, callers in perilous circumstances sought only advice. Callers initiated these interactions using a range of practices that reflected their simultaneous management of (a) the specific, personal projects they were initiating and (b) the impersonal reporting normatively mandated by the default organization of 9–1–1 calls.

We begin by considering the simplest of these projects: instances in which callers simply sought information (but not advice). In such calls, callers typically deploy (in their first turn) a format that very closely resembles those used by callers reporting the fire (as in Extract 2). For example, in Extract 7, the caller formulates her location (line 2), “I live in the Los Osos area” and ostensibly reports a fire (lines 2–4), “there’s been=looks like there’s a large fire up uh uh past Huntington there”:

Extract (7) [PC15:CT3F2]

- 01 CT: Nine one one emergency
 02 → C: Hel:lo:? Uh I live in Los Osos area and there’s
 03 → been=looks like there’s a large fire up uh uh past
 04 → Huntington there [()
 05 CT: [‘Kay] there’s one at one fifty four an’ Old
 06 San Pedro an’ there’s one at thuh dump. area.
 07 → C: Oh okay=Thank you=
 08 CT: =Unhuh
 09 C: Bye bye

Unlike other calls, however, this caller does not display any orientation to the possibility that others may have called to report the fire despite the apparent relevance of such matters for the type of project (reporting) that this caller is ostensibly initiating.

On closer examination, however, at least three features this caller’s *report* suggest that the caller may *not* be initiating a report about the fire after all. First, the caller formulates her location as one that is some distance from the fire. Second, she begins her report using a past tense formulation, “there’s been” (implying that the fire has been going on for some time)—which she abandons in favor of a present tense report. Third, the report she actually completes is designed as a *my side* telling (e.g., using the evidential “looks”) ostensibly targeting a recipient who knows more than she does (Pomerantz, 1980). Thus, although she formats her initial turn as report (using the *there is an X at Y* format), these aspects of the caller’s turn suggest that she is not treating the matter as news (which would make reporting relevant) and that she is *seeking* information about the fire rather than reporting it.

This is borne out by both participants subsequent conduct: First, the CT produces a declarative formulation of the location of the two fires in contrast to the interrogative form used in Extract 2, thereby treating caller’s initial turn as a query about the fire(s) rather than a report of it (them).

Second, the caller treats this formulation as news by registering it with an “oh,” (Heritage, 1984) and then treats this informing as having satisfied the project she initiated in her first turn (with “okay”) and her reason for calling (by adding “thank you”). Third, the CT aligns with this project by advancing the call’s closure instead of delivering a promise of service. In short, both the caller and CT treat the call as having been *initiated* to seek information. It is worth adding, however, that by initiating her (information-seeking) call using a report format, the caller orients to the relevance of reporting as the default activity in 9–1–1 calls and her limited rights to pursue information seeking as an alternative to it.

A similar case can be found in Extract 8. In this case, following a brief expansion of the call’s opening (lines 3–4), the CT promotes a move to the business of the call by offering service: “What can I do for you.” Caller begins with what could be a report, “I’m just trying to tell you,” but abandons it in favor of a formulation that straightforwardly requests information to satisfy her own project: “I’m trying to pinpoint. ...”:

Extract (8) [PC21:CT1F6]

- 01 CT: Have you been helped.
 02 (.)
 03 C: Somebody answered ’nd put me on hold
 04 CT: I know we’re very busy What can I do for you
 05 → C: Well I- I’m jus’ tryin’ tuh tell you- (.) I’m trying to
 06 → pinpoint where this fire is=I’m looking from my house on
 07 → Santa Helena an’ I’m lookin’ right over at Northridge=
 08 CT: =It’s (.1) It is highway one fifty four: below Mountain Glade.
 09 → C: Oh is thet ()
 10 → CT: Yes. Okay?
 11 C: Okay.
 12 CT: Unhuh=bye
 13 C: Bye

Before the caller can complete her turn, however, the CT intersects it (at a point in which her distance from the fire becomes evident) to provide a report of the fire’s location (line 8). As in the previous case, caller treats this as news (line 9). In this case, however, it is the CT who initiates the close of the call (line 10), thereby (a) treating the call as if it had been about information seeking from the beginning and (b) that therefore no promise of assistance was relevant despite the caller’s initial projection of a report (“I’m just trying to tell ...”).

We summarize our analysis to this point as follows. First, the possibility of prior calls reporting the fire has a systematically different import for callers seeking information than for callers reporting the fire. Because prior calls about the fire may render further reports about it redundant, callers attempting to report the fire display an orientation to their possible relevance in their first turn. For callers seeking information, however, the possibility that others might have already called to report the fire does not impinge on the relevance of their project; in fact, prior calls are presupposed by those seeking information. That is, the activity of information seeking is premised on the CT knowing (more) about the event in question (than the caller); an orientation to this distribution of information between caller and CT can be embodied in other features of the caller's opening turns including references to the fire itself as in "this fire" (Extract 8, line 6), which invokes a "known fire" in the course of inquiring about it.

Second, by seeking information in a call, callers initiate a reversal of the default directionality of 9-1-1 calls; as we noted previously, the organization of 9-1-1 calls is designed to facilitate the flow of information to the dispatch center from a vantage-point external to it. In information-seeking calls, callers reverse the flow of information so that callers who are various distances from fire are being informed by people inside the call center.

Third this reversal of information is procedurally consequential for a range of aspects of 9-1-1 calls. For example, callers acknowledge information provided by CTs rather than providing it to them; CTs do not pursue additional information from the caller, nor do they attempt to confirm that the call is related to the *same* fire that previous callers have reported. Thus, in a virtual reversal of the activities in typical calls, callers receive information and ask questions, whereas CTs provide information and answer questions. Most notably, because of this reversal, neither callers nor CTs orient to the relevance of a promise of assistance or the dispatch of service in these calls.

Fourth, these various transformations entail a complication in the rights and responsibilities of both participants that is related to the project of information seeking (and is reflected in the organization of the call): As callers and CTs shift from seeking and providing service to seeking and providing information, CTs become responsible for providing service within the call itself—namely the provision of the information sought by the caller produced in a manner recognizable to her—rather than the dispatch of emergency service personnel. Further, in information-seeking calls, it is callers (rather than CTs) who are responsible for

assessing when CTs (rather than callers) have provided information adequate for the project they have embarked on. As we note following, this can have a substantial impact on the overall organization of 9–1–1 calls. In cases in which callers used report-like formats to seek information, however, the calls remained monofocal, with the business of the call being completed within the initial sequence initiated at the call’s inception. Thus, when callers do not immediately initiate closure of the call at the first possible completion of the sequence (as in Extract 7), CTs do (as in Extract 8). In part, this may reflect a further complication of the rights callers can (or do) claim: In Extracts 7 and 8, callers evidently oriented to their limited rights to seek information from CTs by designing their initial turns so as to respect the primary relevance of (and responsibility for) reporting information in these calls.

EXPOSED PURSUIT OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE

In at least some cases, callers did not hesitate to pursue projects that depart from the normative organization of 9–1–1 calls by asking questions or seeking advice. In the course of pursuing these projects, however, these callers establish a different relationship to the fire—and thus the need for emergency services—than the callers in Extract 7 and 8. As with those Extracts, however, callers initiate calls with turns and projects that establish at least a tangential relationship to the normative organization of 9–1–1 calls.

For example, in Extract 9, the caller begins formulating where she is calling from, “I live at San Miguel Ridge Road,” thereby establishing her proximity to the fire as a basis for a next action. Instead of reporting on the fire, however, the caller moves directly to an overtly information seeking question: “can you tell me where the fire is that’s above me?”:

Extract (9) [PC18:CT3F5]

01	CT:	Nine one one
02	→ C:	Um I live on San Miguel Ridge Road: (.) Can you
03	→	tell me where thuh fire is that’s above me.=
04	CT:	=There’s two fires::
05		(.)
06	C:	The one above me.
07	CT:	I’ve no idea=There’s one at one fifty four and Old

- 08 San Pedro, .hh an' there's one at uh: started on (.)
 09 forty four hundred block: you know where the dump is
 10 C: Yeah I-
 11 CT: 'an it's moving over toward Bel Canto.
 12 C: >Okay< Thanks.

The caller builds a warrant for this request into its very design: By treating “the fire” as a known in common event and by formulating herself as adjacent to it (e.g., “above me,” as opposed to formulating it as merely visible to her), the caller implies that she is, or may be, in jeopardy. Thus, by conveying her proximity to the fire and designing her turn to transparently initiate a request for information, this caller asserts her rights to that information (in contrast to the reluctance displayed by callers who used report-like formulations that were marked by restarts, reformulations and other disfluencies as in Extracts 7 and 8).

In fact, a number of callers used location formulations to establish their proximity to the fire as a basis for pursuing information and advice. The bald assertion of rights to information is especially evident in Extract 10: Note that in this call, the CT treats the caller's location formulation as projecting a report about the fire (in line 3) even though the syntax of caller's turn so far projects a question (e.g., the unit initial “is” after “Bel Canto”). The caller, however, directly rejects this treatment (in line 5), “no I'm not,” and then initiates a request for information: “Can you tell me what's the status of the fire”:

Extract (10) [MG31:CT2M10]

- 01 CT: Nine one one emergency
 02 C: Hi I'm uh resident (up at) Bel Canto is=
 03 → CT: =Okay are you reporting a fire in thee area of Highway
 04 → one fifty four and Old San Pedro.
 05 → C: Uh no I'm not. Can you tell me is it what's the status of
 06 → thuh fire I'm a resident up there on Bel Canto,
 07 CT: Ok it's uh- ((creaky voice)) to- p hh
 08 C: ()
 09 CT: Just uh minute hold on ((to other)) What?
 10 O: Affirmative. We've got duh (.) (the force/fourth) of us
 11 here now we're trying to uh work it out as to what their
 12 ordering uh will be. Uh: it's still their fire=
 13 CT: ((to C)) =Okay, thee fire is out of control right now okay
 14 an' that's about all I can tell ya.

In this context, it is notable that the caller specifically reintroduces his legitimate (e.g., “I’m a resident”) proximity to the fire (“up there on Bel Canto”) as a basis for this request before the CT can respond. Because the CT treated his earlier location formulation as projecting a report, the caller evidently reintroduces his location as a basis for asserting his rights to the information he is pursuing. The CT accepts and acknowledges this claim with “OK” (in line 7) and after some consultation with others (lines 9–12), reports on the status of the fire (line 13, “the fire is out of control right now”) before claiming her own limited access to additional information (line 14), perhaps as a warrant for closing the call.

As these cases illustrate, once the fire had become widespread, callers in its immediate proximity dispensed with the facade of reporting it and began requesting information based on their location in the fire’s path. The very different course of action such calls are initiated to pursue pose yet a different range of contingencies for callers and CTs; and these too are reflected in the callers first turns and each of the subsequent elements of the call. These are most dramatically reflected in changes to the overall structural organization of the call. As we noted in analyzing calls involving reporting as an activity, because the CT is positioned to assess the adequacy of the information provided in the call—or whether she knows about it already—she is the one who initiates closing by announcing that assistance is on its way. Thus, the course of action initiated by the caller and the organization of the request adjacency pair sequence through which it is coordinated are aligned so that supplying the service announcement satisfies the constraints set by the report *and* resolves the course of action on whose behalf it was launched. In information-seeking calls, however, there is a (potentially) more open-ended relationship between the course of action launched in the call and the discrete sequences through which it is conducted.

Because information-seeking calls involve a project initiated by the caller that is personally relevant for her, she is the one who must assess the adequacy of the call so far for that project and initiate the call’s closure—instead of the CT. Although it is still possible for such calls to be realized within a single adjacency pair (as in Extracts 7 and 8), information- and advice-seeking calls can be considerably expanded. The relationship between information seeking and call closure is evident in Extract 11.

In this case, a caller provides a location formulation (line 3) as the basis for requesting information regarding the location of the fire (line 5–7)

and its path (line 9). After the caller only hesitantly accepts the information the CT supplies (with the delayed “okay” in line 13), the CT offers prospective advice regarding what the caller might do next (in lines 14–15), perhaps in an attempt to prompt the caller to initiate closing:

Extract (11) [MG24:CT4M2]

- 01 CT: Nine one one emergency
 02 C: Yes=I was just talking to someone there=we got cut off
 03 .hh uh I'm on North Jefferson above Washington?
 04 CT: Yes ma'm.
 05 → C: And it looks to me like that eh fire is just on thee
 06 → other side of our foothills. Is that thuh same one that's
 07 → at one five four?
 08 CT: That's correct.
 09 C: Eh it[s] It's not any closer?
 10 CT: [Ih] No: it's not coming down
 11 yet.
 12 (.)
 13 C: O:kay,
 14 CT: .hh But you might want to jus' watch it. It's gonnah put
 15 up a lot of smoke.
 16 C: Okay.
 17 → CT: Alrighty
 18 → C: Is thuh best thing to keep everything closed?
 19 → CT: I would yes.
 20 C: Okay thank you
 21 CT: Alrighty, bye.

After the caller merely accepts this advice (with “okay,” line 16), the CT makes a more explicit move to initiate closure, although still using a form “alrighty” (in line 17) that defers to the caller as the party with rights to decide when she is satisfied. As it happens, this caller is *not* satisfied; she asks a further question (in line 18), and only after getting an answer to that does she indicate that she is prepared to close the call (with “okay thank you”). The reversal in the directionality embodied in these information- and advice-seeking calls, then, results in an asymmetry between caller and CT regarding project completion that is not evident in standard, report-type calls. In contrast to Extract 1 in which the promise of service established the relevance of closing for *both* parties, the recognizability of project completion in information- and advice-seeking calls (such as in Extracts 10–14) may be much more complicated—and even opaque—for CTs because they can-

not know what personal concerns the caller may have or how they might be satisfied.

As this call demonstrates, the different directionality established by the callers opening request for information results in at least three other shifts in the organization of these calls. First, because it is the caller—who must be satisfied, the close of the call is more directly contingent on *her* orienting to the course of action as complete. Second, because the activity of information seeking can span multiple sequences, the call involves multiple follow-up questions initiated *by the caller* that expand that activity and delay the close of the call. Third, the more open-ended character of information seeking as an activity, together with the distribution of information established at the call's outset, can be exploited as a basis for seeking advice. For example, in Extract 11, after the CT suggests “watching the fire” (in lines 14–15), the caller asks for more substantive advice (in line 18) regarding how to manage his house. In this fashion, the distribution of rights and responsibilities has been decisively shifted, with callers asserting the right to seek information or advice and CTs assuming the responsibility for providing information or advice *insofar as she can*. As we show, however, requests for advice can be particularly problematic for CTs.

A similar pattern of information and advice seeking is evident in Extract 12. In this case, after the caller formulates his proximity to the fire, he projects a potentially casual interest in it by reporting “we were just wondering”; the CT cuts this turn off by formulating the location of the fire as a response to the caller's *question*, thereby anticipating a simple information-seeking call. The caller notably declines to treat the formulation as news (with “Right” in line 10) and pursues an assessment of the fire's status (line 10) that is marked (through the repetition of “wondering”) as the same query the CT has just preempted (Schegloff, 1987):

Extract (12) [MG22:CT1F7]

01	CT:	Nine one one emergency	
02	→ C:	Uh yes This is Willis Randall at ten eight six San Miguel	
03		Ridge Road,	
04	CT:	Yes sir.	
05	→ C:	And we're just wondering we see some <u>fla:mes</u> : 'r smo:ke	
06		(.) uh: somewhere around [()=
07	CT:	[It's Highway Two Thirty Five]	
08		=Highway one fifty four south of San Migue- uh south of	

- 09 uh Mountain Glade.
 10 → C: Right so we're kinda wondering about thuh state of thuh
 11 ()=
 12 CT: =I don't know where it's headed sir.
 13 (.)
 14 C: Uh: so we should jus' keep our eyes open,
 15 CT: Yeah keep your eye on it We've got equipment on thuh
 16 scene=but keep you eye on it.
 17 (.)
 18 C: Okay,
 19 → CT: Okay?
 20 → C: Uh: so (.) your advice would just be to watch it and
 21 stay in thuh house for the moment=
 22 → CT: =Whatever you feel comfortable with.
 23 (.)
 24 C: Okay:
 25 → CT: Okay?
 26 → C: Okay thanks.
 27 CT: Unhuh bye
 28 C: G'bye

When the CT declines to provide a substantive response to the callers request (line 12), the caller pushes the matter by treating the declination as the basis for a relatively optimistic piece of advice, delivered as its upshot: "So we should just keep an eye on it." After the CT confirms the advice and makes two moves to close the call (first by delivering a modified service report in lines 15–16, "we've got equipment on thuh scene," and then more explicitly with "okay?" in line 19), the caller attempts to translate the prior commonsense suggestion (to be careful or watchful) into a potentially official position regarding evacuation (lines 20–21). By asking whether the CT's advice is to "stay in the house for the moment," the caller indirectly introduces issue of whether to evacuate or not, thereby implicating the caller taker's position as an *official* in a way that the commonsense advice did not. We note that the CT is noticeably more reticent to accept this formulation and responds by returning the decision back to the caller (line 22).

As these examples suggest, once the fire became widespread, citizens began calling 9–1–1 seeking information regarding the circumstances it posed for them and advice regarding what they should do about it. Whereas information seeking was dealt with routinely, callers seeking advice encountered less satisfactory resolutions—as in Extract 12. In closing, we consider two cases in which CTs evidently struggled with the requests for advice posed by callers.

In Extract 13, the caller's location formulation describes a situation—fire above and below—that establishes the immanent threat the fire may pose for him. Having established his proximity to the fire, the caller poses a question (in lines 3–5) that oscillates between information and advice seeking:

Extract (13)[MG12:CT1F4]

- 01 CT: None one one emergency=may I help you?
 02 C: Um yeah I'm up in thuh Rancho Flores hills an there's -
 03 uh fire below my house an' above my house an' I wanna
 04 know if I'm- if it's under control or if I'm supposed to
 05 evacua[te
 06 → CT: [It's NOT under control sir. It's at uh Highway Two
 07 Thirty Five(.) an' Mountain Glade (.) on thuh south side of
 08 [thuh road
 09 C: [(okay) are we supposed to evacuate
 10 CT: I: don't think they've- ((to another CT)) Have they given
 11 CT: any evacuation orders f- forTwo Thirty Five an uh- no
 12 C: Old San Pedro Road?
 13 (.)
 14 CT: Old San Pedro?
 15 C: Yes.
 16 CT: Yeah=why don't you. (.) Yeah. There- we haven't (.) had
 17 any evacuation notices er- (.) Oh- ((to other CT)) Rob?
 18 ((to caller)) >Hold on uh second<
 19 (0.3)
 20 → C: It's blowin' (.) serious[ly
 21 → CT: [Yeah I know sir=
 22 C: =Eh- ect (I-)=
 23 → CT: =You might- take that under consideration,
 24 → C: Ok- so[eh-
 25 CT: [Ok=
 26 → C: We're packin< I'm out [()]=
 27 → CT: [I would =If it were me:
 28 I would.=
 29 C: [()]
 30 → CT: [I'm not tellin' you to evacuate. Bu[t uh
 31 C: [Ok 'cause the winds
 32 are real bad up here=

The question he completes is composed of two parts. The first half solicits information, “is the fire under control,” whereas the second half seeks advice: “If I’m supposed to evacuate.” In so doing, the caller combines the

activities of information and advice seeking (much as the callers in Extracts 11 and 12 did); by combining these activities and delivering them as alternatives in his first turn of the call, however, the caller effectively promotes advice seeking to the official reason for the call (as opposed to using the successful pursuit of information as a premise for seeking advice as in Extracts 11 and 12). The specific advice pursued by this caller and the design of the turn he uses to pursue it each warrant specific attention.

First, there is the type of advice: As adumbrated in our analysis of Extract 12, advice regarding whether to evacuate or stay put poses a serious problem for CTs because any such pronouncements, offered in an official capacity, requires specific authorization from the National Forest Service (the agency in control of the fire), with the evacuation order being implemented by county sheriff's personnel. In simple terms, the caller has requested a piece of advice that the CT is literally not entitled to provide because no order had yet been given. The specific practice the caller uses to pose this issue, however, offers the CT some resources for managing this constraint without having to reject it altogether.

By combining information and advice seeking in *either/or* turn format, the caller poses his request for advice in a question that provides for a choice between contrasting alternatives: Either (a) the fire is under control—which would tacitly imply that he does not need to evacuate—or (b) the CT could tacitly imply that the fire is not under control by conveying that he should evacuate. The CT responds by breaking contiguity to negate the *information-seeking alternative* (“It’s NOT under control sir.”), supplying the caller with an inferential basis for making a decision while avoiding an official position on the matter of evacuation. Thus, the CT manages her limited rights to offer official advice by responding to the information-seeking aspect of the callers question and producing her turn in such a way (e.g., with the emphasis on “NOT”) as to emphasize the advice it implies.

The CT's subsequent contributions maintain a similar balance between reporting the official position that no evacuation order has been given while tacitly encouraging the caller to evacuate. For example, after another round in which the caller pursues an official evacuation order (line 9), and the CT and delivers the official position that none has been given (lines 16–18), the caller reports a grave condition (line 20) apparently in an attempting to persuade the CT to change her position. The CT responds by turning the matter back to the caller (“You might take that into consideration”) that finally succeeds in prompting the caller to arrive at her *own*

decision (in line 26), “Ok soeh we’re packin < I’m out ()—which the caller delivers as if it were a product of the CT’s advice by prefacing it with “Ok.” The CT immediately supports this decision; however, she does so in a turn that oscillates between her status as a common-sense actor and her official capacity as a 9–1–1 operator: She says “if it were me I would” before adding “I’m not tellin’ you to evacuate. But.” We note that the CT completes the latter part of her turn with “But,” thereby syntactically projecting more talk—and advice in particular—although she stops short of actually delivering it.

The conflicted design of the CT’s turn reflects the speaker’s simultaneous management of the conflicting demands placed on her: On one hand, the caller’s request for advice attributes the authority to offer an official evacuation order that she is not, in fact, in a position to provide; on the other hand, as one common-sense actor responding to another’s desperate plea for advice in dire circumstances, she can hardly decline to respond. Indeed, over the course of the entire call, the CT manages various instantiations of this very dilemma by offering advice virtually—by providing the material out of which the caller can infer the advice she has sought from the beginning while also resisting any treatment of that advice as “official.” In turn, the caller resolves the CT’s dilemma by treating this *virtual* advice as actual advice and acting on it.

In this respect, CTs respect the constraint on delivering advice while departing from it in much the way callers seeking information managed constraints on that action: They formulate turns that have the appearance of officially sanctioned actions, although nonetheless producing them in such a way that makes recognizable the alternative actions they actually implement (and that recipients treated them as implementing). In this way, CTs exhibit an orientation to their limited rights to provide advice in circumstances in which they apparently feel compelled to offer it anyway.

In Extract 13 (and another call not shown here), the CT evidently struggled with the confluence of the immanent threat posed by the fire and official restraints on advising evacuation. In both calls, she responds to direct requests for advice by providing only an inferential basis for callers to make their own decision to evacuate; in both calls, the CT consults colleagues calls to determine if an evacuation order exists. She employs the *if I were you/if it were me* frame to offer virtual advice while stating that no such advice was being offered. Thus, by proposing that a reasonable person confronted by this situation would evacuate, the CT attempts to encourage the callers to do the same without officially issuing such an order.

In Extracts 9 and 13, we have noted that the requests for information and advice that citizens in the path of the fire felt entitled to pursue reflected a range of shifts in the presuppositions embodied in caller's first turns, the projects pursued by callers, and the organization and resolution of the sequences through which these were pursued. Most profoundly, these changes result in a reversal in the directionality of these calls—in which callers seek information and CTs provide it, a consequent shift in the rights and responsibilities of those parties, and a transformation of the overall organization of the calls. Finally, in Extract 13, we considered CTs' orientation to constraints on advice giving; just as callers some distance from the fires conveyed their limited rights to pursue information about it by designing their requests for information in report and report-like formats, CTs managed their limited rights to give advice by packaging their turns as *virtual advice*. Thus, across these calls, both callers and CTs pursued projects that departed from the normative organization of 9-1-1 calls while nonetheless exhibiting respect for that organization.

CONCLUSIONS

The widespread nature of the Mountain Glade Fire and the number of people actually or potentially affected by it resulted in multiple calls to 9-1-1. Many of them were aimed not at reporting the fire but seeking information as to its location of progress or advice about evacuation. Our examination of these calls revealed how the organization of emergency calls and the presuppositions and distribution of rights and responsibilities that it institutionalizes was incrementally but systematically altered over the course these multiple calls. The initial calls simply reported the fire. Then, as the blaze grew more visible, other callers called to report the fire but in a turn designed make the report contingent on the CT's knowledge of the fire. As the CT did know, the caller's report was transformed into a confirmation request, also changing the actions undertaken by the CT (confirming that the fire had been reported and that the fire the caller was calling about was the same fire.) Nevertheless, the callers' project was to report the fire if not already reported, and the directionality and distribution of rights and responsibilities was preserved over departures from the organization of routine emergency calls.

Another shift in the features displayed by these calls is the use of a report format, or preliminary elements of it, to seek information about

the status or location of the fire. In these calls, the directionality of the calls changes as does the distribution of rights and responsibilities (now the caller is seeking information, the CT providing it). A further shift occurs when callers drop the pretense of reporting or any concern about prior reports to directly engage the CT with requests for information or advice. In all of these calls, the caller presumes that the CT has knowledge of the fire (often presuming more knowledge than the CT possessed) and on this basis, the CT's capacity to give advice. At this point, the 9-1-1 call has been warped into activities it was not designed to perform.

Other events with community wide impact—whether actual or merely potential—appear to have similar consequences for emergency services such as 9-1-1. For example, on the evening of June 15, 2005, a 7.2 earthquake 80 miles off the coast of Northern California prompted the issuance of a tsunami warning for the Pacific Coast from Washington to the Mexican border. The alert was distributed to many emergency officials but not all, and some of them became aware of the alert from reports in the media or from concerned callers who had seen the alert notification on television (Chong & Becerra, 2005b). In the words of one of one official, “It just started raining phone calls ... [Callers] wanted to know what to do, where to go, what to do with the dog ... It was very hectic” (Chong & Garvey, 2005a, p. A.1). Callers besieged 9-1-1 with questions concerning the event that CTs were unable to answer, an outcome that very closely resembles what happened when people trapped in the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, called 9-1-1 for help.

The institutional response to this reversal—of the direction that information flows and the alternation of the distribution of rights and obligations—has been to develop alternative services such as *reverse 9-1-1*. This service telephones people in an affected area to give them warnings or issue evacuation orders, although whether such warnings could be delivered in a timely enough fashion to matter is another question (Chong & Becerra, 2005b). In some areas, a new three-digit number, 2-1-1, has been designated for callers with nonemergency problems including information on disaster response, relief, emergency shelter, and so forth. These developments reflect practitioners understanding that the established purpose of 9-1-1 (and implicitly, its interactional organization) is not well suited to deal with community members' need for information and advice with respect to individual and collective troubles. That a wholly new service would be required to handle such emergencies suggests that the sort of

activities contemplated for them may not be feasible within the framework of a routine 9–1–1 call. Why might a new service be required instead of, say, merely teaching 9–1–1 operators to talk differently?

Our examination of the problems encountered in caller and CT's management of these encounters reflects a possible source of this institutional resistance to change: the organized practice through which an institution is routinely produced and embodied in interaction. The existence of these deeply routinized practices can make the pursuit of alternative activities within (and against) that organization problematic. We have noted that underlying even the changes in practices displayed by these calls was an attempt to preserve the ordinary structure of the calls. Callers who made their report contingent on CT's prior knowledge nevertheless looked for (and resisted departures from) the routine way of closing ordinary emergency calls (the service announcement), and CTs were observed to use it in an appropriately modified form. Callers who apparently set out, from the start, to do something other than report an emergency employed the report format or elements of it to launch their request for information or advice. Even those callers that were most direct in seeking information or advice began with a preexpansion element (caller's location) as a preface to their requests. Thus, even in departures from the institutionalized practices of emergency telecommunications, callers and CTs were not free to disregard its constraints.

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